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Economic Performance and Market 
Work Activity in Sweden after the 
Crisis of the Early 1990s
Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson
7.1    Introduction
Since emerging from a severe contraction in the early 1990s, the Swedish 
economy has accumulated a strong record of output growth, outpacing the 
average growth rate in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and in the European Union (EU-  15). The perfor-
mance of the Swedish labor market has been less impressive. By 2005, hours 
worked per person were still 10.5 percent below the 1990 peak and a mere 1 
percent above the 1993 trough. Employment rates tell a similar story.
We more fully describe Swedish developments with respect to output and 
market work activity in the balance of this section. We then turn to several 
aspects of the Swedish institutional setup that repress market work activity. 
Our discussion highlights the role of high tax rates on labor income and con-
sumption expenditures, wage-  setting arrangements that compress relative 
wages, and business tax policies that disfavor labor-  intensive industries and 
technologies. We describe these features of the Swedish institutional setup 
and provide evidence of their consequences based on Swedish outcomes 
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and international comparisons. We also identify some noteworthy policy 
changes since 2006 and their potential eﬀects on market work activity in 
Sweden.
7.1.1    Output  Growth
Beginning in the mid-   to late 1960s, Swedish gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth slowed relative to earlier decades and relative to other rich 
countries. Income per capita fell from third or fourth place among OECD 
countries in 1970 to seventeenth place in 1993, dropping some 20 percent-
age points relative to the OECD average (Lindbeck 1997; Henrekson 2001). 
Since the 1993 trough, the Swedish growth record has greatly improved 
relative to the contemporaneous performance in other rich countries and 
relative to the previous two decades. Sweden’s output grew almost 3 percent 
per annum from 1994 to 2005, well above the average pace in the EU- 15 and 
the OECD. In terms of per capita GDP growth, Sweden even outperformed 
the United States over this period. No doubt, rapid growth after 1993 partly 
reﬂ  ects a rebound from an unusually deep contraction in the early 1990s. 
Nevertheless, the Swedish economy had not experienced such rapid growth 
on a sustained basis since the 1960s, a decade often seen as the golden age 
of the Swedish model.1
Sweden’s rapid output growth in recent years has not translated into com-
parable gains in relative income because of deterioration in its terms of trade 
(Håkansson and Lindbeck 2005). The industry composition of Swedish 
output growth in recent years is also noteworthy. As reported in table 7.1, 
manufacturing accounts for 41 percent of the real output gains in Sweden’s 
private sector from 1994 to 2005.2 Nearly half of the output growth within 
manufacturing took place in electrical and optical products. This aspect of 
Swedish output growth is particularly striking in light of manufacturing’s 
falling share of output, and especially of employment, in the world’s rich 
countries in recent decades. The terms-  of-  trade deterioration has probably 
helped stimulate the growth of Sweden’s manufacturing output (measured 
at constant prices).
Outside manufacturing, the greatest contributions to the growth of Swe-
den’s private sector occurred in trade, transportation and communication, 
real estate, and business services. Output grew relatively rapidly in education, 
health and community, and personal services, but from a very modest base. 
We will return to the performance of market-  based services in our analysis 
of Sweden’s institutional setup.
1. The average GDP growth rate in Sweden was 4.1 percent in 1966 to 1970, 5.2 percent in 
1961 to 1965, and 3.4 percent in 1951 to 1960 (Statistics Sweden).
2. When measuring GDP from the production side, Statistics Sweden calls this “total market 
producers and producers for own ﬁ  nal use.” This roughly corresponds to total production, 
excluding government production. However, it should be noted that incorporated production 
units wholly owned by the government, such as the postal service, housing owned and run by 
local governments, and incorporated public hospitals are classiﬁ  ed as market producers.Economic Performance and Market Work Activity in Sweden    2 2 7
7.1.2    Market  Work  Activity
Figure 7.1 displays cumulative changes in Sweden’s employment and 
population since 1950. As stressed in our original study, the second half 
of the twentieth century saw almost no net job growth in Sweden’s private 
sector, even though the working-  age population expanded by roughly one 
million persons. In contrast, government employment grew more than one 
for one with the working-  age population until 1990.
The early 1990s marked a pronounced departure from employment pat-
terns in earlier decades in two respects. First, government and private employ-
ment fell sharply relative to the working-  age population. The employment-
  population ratio fell by roughly 10 percentage points within a few years, 
and the open unemployment rate soared to levels not seen since the Great 
Depression. Second, the partial employment recovery after 1993 occurred 
almost exclusively in the private sector. In fact, private-  sector employment 
exceeded its previous peak in Sweden by 2001, while government employ-
ment remains well below the levels of the 1980s. Private- sector employment 
fell again after 2001, however, and aggregate employment in 2005 remained 
well below its peak in 1990.
Despite the impression given by ﬁ  gure 7.1, the extent to which the Swedish 
private sector has rediscovered a capacity for job creation is unclear. Some 
of the measured gains in private-  sector employment reﬂ  ect changes in the 
legal form of organization rather than new job creation within the private 
sector. For example, when a regional government incorporates its hospitals, 
employment at these hospitals is reclassiﬁ  ed into the private sector. As a 
somewhat diﬀerent example, when a publicly funded private school substi-
tutes for a municipal school, the eﬀect is to boost measured employment in 
the private sector.
Relative to population, employment was much higher in Sweden than in 
the United States and the rest of the OECD until the deep contraction of 
the early 1990s. It then fell below the value in the United States and greatly 
narrowed the gap relative to the average of other countries in the OECD.
Table 7.1 also presents a breakdown of employment and employment 
growth in Sweden’s nongovernment sector from 1994 to 2005. Nongovern-
ment employment grew by 11.3 percent, and all of the net gains occurred 
in the service sector. Sizable contributions to nongovernment employment 
growth occurred in wholesale and retail trade, real estate, renting and business 
services, and education, health, and social work. Manufacturing employ-
ment fell by 3 percent, despite a 95 percent gain in real value added.
Although widely studied, employment and unemployment statistics 
have serious limitations as measures of overall work activity. Deﬁ  nitions 
of employment and unemployment are seldom straightforward, and they 
change over time and diﬀer among countries in ways that defy easy com-
parisons. These data are especially problematic when used as measures of 
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Oﬃcial statistics for Sweden show high rates of employment in the 
working- age population. For example, Statistics Sweden reports an employ-
ment rate of 77 percent in 2004 for persons twenty to sixty- four years of age. 
This ﬁ  gure reﬂ  ects many employed persons who are not actually working—
including those on sick leave, some students and conscripts, some persons 
on unpaid leave, people on paid parental leave, and people on temporary 
leave to care for a sick child. Sickness leave, in particular, is a major source of 
absenteeism in the Swedish economy. Because oﬃcial employment statistics 
make no adjustment for sickness leave and other factors just mentioned, they 
overstate Sweden’s aggregate labor input. The OECD (2005, 82) estimates 
that the number of persons actually at work in Sweden is 10 percentage 
points lower than the employment rate for men and 15 percentage points 
lower for women.
Oﬃcial unemployment measures in Sweden also paint an overly strong 
picture of labor market performance. The open unemployment rate in Swe-
den was 5.5 percent as of 2004, according to Statistics Sweden, but several 
more comprehensive measures of unemployment have been suggested. They 
generally include all or part of the following categories: people on sick leave, 
parental leave, leave to care for family members, and unpaid leave; partici-
pants in labor market programs; discouraged workers; people on welfare; 
and early retirees. It is virtually impossible to agree on an exact number, but 
expansive concepts of Swedish unemployment yield ﬁ  gures in the range of 
18 to 24 percent of the labor force (Edling 2005).
As a broad measure of labor input, hours actually worked per person 
is a more useful indicator and one that sidesteps some of the conceptual 
and measurement issues that arise with employment and unemployment 
Fig. 7.1    Cumulative employment and population changes in Sweden, 1950 to 2005
Source: Statistics Sweden and own calculations.230        Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson
measures. At a minimum, hours- based measures of work activity shed addi-
tional light on the behavior of aggregate labor inputs. Hours worked per 
person aged sixteen to sixty-  four years fell by 11 percent from 1990 to 1993 
(from 1,325 to 1,178 hours).3 The recovery from 1993 to 2005 is only a tiny 
eight hours. Hours worked per person of working age in 2005 are 10.5 per-
cent below the level of 1990.
These data on hours worked derive from self- reported measures in samples 
of persons. As of 2004, average reported hours of work per employed per-
son is 1,630. This ﬁ  gure may well be an overstatement, given the incidence 
of part-  time work, sick leave absenteeism, parental leave, training, and so 
forth among those counted as employed in Sweden. Some support for this 
view comes from a survey of 500 ﬁ  rms collected by the Confederation of 
Swedish Employers. According to this source, the average number of actual 
hours worked among full- time employees in the private sector was 1,554 
hours in 2005.4 In comparison, the average of self-  reported hours worked 
for all employees in 2004 was about 5 percent higher. In this regard, it should 
be noted that absenteeism of every kind, as well as part-  time work, is more 
prevalent in the public sector. Additional evidence comes from OECD esti-
mates for average hours by full- year equivalent workers in 2002, accounting 
for various kinds of absences. According to the OECD (2005, table 4.1), 
the estimate for Sweden is only 1,349 hours, dramatically lower than self-
 reported hours. (The corresponding European average is 1,567 work hours.) 
In short, these comparisons suggest that oﬃcial statistics substantially over-
state market work activity in Sweden.
Figure 7.2 shows average hours per person of working age from 1956 to 
2003 in Sweden and the United States.5 Average work time evolves along 
remarkably diﬀerent paths in the two countries, with Americans working 
much less than Swedes in the 1950s and much more by the 1990s. Among 
Swedes aged ﬁ  fteen to sixty-  four years, work time fell by more than 200 
hours per year from 1956 to 1972. Swedish work time then ﬂ  uctuated in a 
narrow band for ﬁ  fteen years, before recovering somewhat in the late 1980s 
3. Measures of hours worked are also subject to errors and interpretation diﬃculties. In this 
regard, we note that Statistics Sweden revised their estimates of the annual number of hours 
worked per employed person upward in the early 2000s. For example, the ﬁ  gure for 1997 (as 
reported in the OECD Employment Outlook) was revised upward by seventy-  eight hours.
4. See Svenskt Näringslivs Tidsanvändningsstatistik, a quarterly publication. The data on 
work and absenteeism cover 200,000 employees at 500 ﬁ  rms with roughly 2,500 establishments. 
Reporting ﬁ  rms have chosen to participate, so the response rate is 100 percent.
5. We rely on international data on average hours worked per person of working age supplied 
by Richard Rogerson (2006), who compiled the data from OECD sources and from data made 
available by the Groningen Growth and Development Center, available at: http:/  /  www.ggdc
.net/ . The Groningen data on annual hours worked are “intended to include paid overtime and 
exclude paid hours that are not worked due to sickness, vacation and holidays, etc.” Neverthe-
less, since the Groningen data rely heavily on oﬃcial national sources, they are subject to the 
same concerns expressed in the text regarding inaccurate reports of hours actually worked. 
These concerns apply to the data for all countries, but they may be more serious for Sweden.Economic Performance and Market Work Activity in Sweden    2 3 1
and plummeting to new lows in the 1990s. Hours per working-  age Swede 
dropped by 11.5 percent, from 1,261 in 1990 to 1,116 in 1993. In contrast, 
average hours among working-  age Americans rose rapidly, from 1,179 in 
1982 to 1,413 in 2000, and then fell sharply after 2000 from a very high base. 
According to these data, as of 2003, Americans spend 150 hours more per 
year in market work activity than Swedes.
Large national diﬀerences in the level and time path of average hours 
worked hold more broadly among rich countries, as Rogerson (2006) 
eﬀectively highlights. Compared to other rich countries, the United States 
experienced unusually large gains in average hours worked after the early 
1980s, but Australia, Canada, and New Zealand had similar experiences. 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, among 
other countries, experienced large declines in average work time from high 
levels in the 1950s and 1960s, much like Sweden. Average hours fell even 
more sharply in Germany, France, and Italy. They fell by smaller amounts 
from higher starting points in Switzerland and Japan. Greece, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, and Spain experienced large increases in average work hours 
after the late 1980s, partly reversing declines in previous decades. The over-
all picture is one of remarkable heterogeneity among rich countries in the 
evolution of average work time.
Figure 7.3 displays the joint evolution of average work hours and per cap-
ita output in Sweden and the United States. The prevailing longer- term pat-
tern in Sweden is one of output gains accompanied by decreases in average 
work hours. In sharp contrast, the prevailing pattern in the United States is 
one of output gains accompanied by increases in average hours. Judging by 
Fig. 7.2    Average hours worked per person aged ﬁ  fteen to sixty-  four, 1956 to 2003, 
Sweden and the United States
Source: Rogerson (2006), as compiled from OECD sources and the Groningen Growth and 
Development Center.232        Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson
the experience of these two countries in recent decades, there is no natural 
tendency for the amount of time devoted to market work activity to either 
rise or fall as per capita output rises. Instead, the long- term response of mar-
ket work activity appears to depend greatly on country-  speciﬁ  c features.
7.1.3    Time-  Use  Surveys
The preceding section draws on standard sources for data on employment 
and hours worked in the market sector. Time- use surveys allow for a broader 
view of work activity that includes time devoted to (unpaid) work activity out-
side the market sector. We draw on evidence from time- use surveys to brieﬂ  y 
address three questions. First, how much time do Swedish and American 
adults devote to work activity outside the market sector? Second, how does 
the composition of time spent outside paid employment diﬀer between the 
two countries? And third, how do trends in the amount of time devoted to 
overall work activity compare to those for market work activity?
Table 7.2 addresses the ﬁ  rst two questions, drawing on time-  use data for 
persons between twenty and seventy-  four years of age in Sweden (2000 to 
2001) and the United States (2004). On average, Americans spend 138 more 
hours per year in paid employment than Swedes according to the time-  use 
data, an amount very similar to the extra 150 hours per year according to 
labor force surveys. However, Swedes spend an extra 95 hours per year in 
domestic household work, excluding child care. In other words, the U.S.-
 Swedish diﬀerence in time spent on overall work activity, inclusive of domes-
tic household work, is less than one-  third the diﬀerence in time devoted to 
Fig. 7.3    The joint evolution of average work hours and per capita output in Sweden 
and the United States, 1960 to 2003
Source: Authors’ calculations on data from Rogerson (2006) and OECD sources.
Note: Average hours is average annual hours worked among persons ﬁ  fteen to sixty- four years 
of age. Real output is measured in 2000 Swedish kronor (SEK) and U.S. dollars (USD), re-
spectively.Economic Performance and Market Work Activity in Sweden    2 3 3
paid employment.6 If unpaid child care is treated as part of domestic work 
activity, then the extra time devoted by Swedes to nonmarket work activity 
falls by half.
Remarkably, table 7.2 indicates that Americans enjoy more leisure time 
than Swedes—an extra 37 hours per year or an extra 84 hours per year 
if unpaid child care is treated as leisure. Another striking feature of the 
Table 7.2  Time-  use breakdown, Sweden and the United States compared
Men and women, 20–74 years old










per day  
Hours 
per year
1. Study 0.21 0.28 –0.07
2. Travel (excluding travel during 
work)
1.30 1.44 –0.15
2a. Commuting to and from work 0.32 0.33 –0.01
3. Free time 15.51 15.55 –0.04 –13
3a. Personal care 10.29 10.43 –0.14
3b. Leisure activities 5.22 5.12 0.10 37
4. Work 6.38 6.26 0.12 43
4a. Paid employment 3.90 3.53 0.38 138
4b. Domestic work (excluding 
child care)
2.47 2.73 –0.26 –95
Food prep, dishwashing 0.55 0.89 –0.35 –126
Cleaning dwelling 0.36 0.38 –0.02
Laundry 0.20 0.17 0.03
Construction and repairs, 
gardening, pets
0.56 0.59 –0.03 –12
Shopping and services 0.53 0.43 0.10 35
Other 0.28 0.27 0.01
5. Child care (unpaid) 0.50 0.38 0.13 47
6. Unspeciﬁ  ed time use 0.11 0.10 0.00
Domestic work  child care 2.98 3.11 –0.13 –48
Leisure activities  child care   5.72   5.49   0.23   84
Sources: Sweden: Harmonised European Time- Use Survey (HETUS) Pocketbook, available at: 
http://circa.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/dsis/tus/library?1/comparable_statistics/sweden_25_01xls/
_EN_1.0_&ad. United States: authors’ calculations on microdata from the American Time-
  Use Survey, available at: http://www.bls.gov/tus/dataﬁ  les_2004.htm.
Note: Personal care includes sleeping, eating, and other personal care activities. Leisure in-
cludes unpaid volunteer work outside the household and care of adults who do not reside in 
the household. Large breaks at work (e.g., time spent on lunch break) are classiﬁ  ed as part of 
paid employment under work- related activities, but short breaks are treated diﬀerently for the 
two countries. They are classiﬁ  ed as work time for Sweden and as leisure time for the United 
States.
6. Olovsson (2009) reaches a similar conclusion from tabulations in Juster and Staﬀord (1991) 
of time devoted to nonmarket work activity in Sweden and the United States in the 1980s. Free-
man and Schettkat (2005) report similar diﬀerences between the United States and Germany.234        Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson
comparison pertains to time devoted to meals in the domestic household sec-
tor. Swedes spend an extra 126 hours per year, roughly 2.4 hours per week, 
on food preparation and cleanup. These patterns in the data are consistent 
with a theory of tax eﬀects on task assignment and time allocation, which 
we describe in section 7.3.2. They are also consistent with evidence described 
later of how taxes on consumption expenditures and labor income alter the 
mix of market production activities.
Turning to trends in time use, Aguiar and Hurst (2006) document changes 
in time devoted to leisure and work activity from 1965 to 2003 by Ameri-
cans aged twenty-  one to sixty-  ﬁ  ve, excluding students and early retirees. 
They ﬁ  nd very large increases in leisure time of six to nine hours per week 
for men and four to eight hours per week for women. The precise ﬁ  gure 
depends on the exact deﬁ  nition of leisure and the variables used to control 
for shifts in demographic structure. Among men, the rise in leisure mainly 
reﬂ  ects a decline in time devoted to paid employment. Among women, it re-
ﬂ  ects a large decline in time devoted to domestic work that more than oﬀsets 
rising time in paid employment. Total work time—paid employment plus 
domestic work—declined by about eight hours per week for both men and 
women over the period covered by the study. In sum, working-  age Ameri-
cans enjoyed large gains in leisure time after 1965, with no decline in time 
devoted to paid employment (ﬁ  gure 7.2). Because Americans spend a larger 
portion of their adult years in retirement now than in decades past, the 
gains in leisure time among all adults are even larger than suggested by the 
ﬁ  ndings of Aguiar and Hurst. We are unaware of a comparable study for 
Sweden, but Statistics Norway reports very similar trends in time use from 
1971 to 2000.7
7.1.4      Expansion in Market Work Activity from 2006 to 2008
There has been a signiﬁ  cant increase in Swedish employment and hours 
worked since 2006, particularly in the private sector. For instance, since the 
second quarter of 2006, the number of hours worked per person aged sixteen 
to sixty-  four increased by 6.7 percent in the private sector, and employment 
increased by 6.4 percent. We discuss recent developments in market work 
activity and the potential role of recent policy reforms in section 7.4.
7.1.5    Summary
We summarize the main points of this section. First, despite Sweden’s 
rapid output growth since 1993, there was little net job creation and almost 
no gain in market work hours per person through 2005. As of 2005, Swedes 
aged sixteen to sixty- four spent 10 percent fewer hours in market work activ-
ity than in 1990. Second, Sweden has experienced a considerable shift away 
from public-  sector employment since 1990. It is unclear how much of this 
7.  Available  at:  http:/ / www.ssb.no/ english/ subjects/ 00/ 02/ 20/ tidsbruk_en/ .Economic Performance and Market Work Activity in Sweden    2 3 5
shift reﬂ  ects newly created jobs in the private sector rather than a reclas-
siﬁ  cation of existing employment positions. Third, the time path of market 
work hours is strikingly diﬀerent in Sweden and the United States over 
the past several decades. Fifty years ago, Swedes spent 200 more hours per 
year than Americans in market work activity; today, they spend 150 fewer 
hours. Fourth, broader measures of work activity that encompass time spent 
on unpaid domestic work show a much smaller gap between Swedes and 
Americans. Based on a comparison of recent time-  use surveys, we ﬁ  nd that 
American adults spend an extra 43 hours per year in overall work activity. 
Swedes spend considerably more time than Americans in unpaid domestic 
work, especially in food preparation and cleanup, and Americans actually 
enjoy greater leisure time. Fifth, the Swedish private sector has experienced 
a signiﬁ  cant increase in employment and hours worked from 2006 to 2008.
7.2      Main Thesis and Lessons from Earlier Work
Our earlier work holds that institutional arrangements strongly inﬂ  uence 
national economic performance. In line with this broad thesis, we developed 
evidence and analysis that country- speciﬁ  c institutional arrangements have 
important eﬀects on work activity, industry structure, activity shares of 
smaller and younger businesses, and the size of the underground economy.
7.2.1      Tax Burdens on Consumption and Labor
Taxes on labor income and consumption expenditures encourage sub-
stitution from the legal market sector to home production and the under-
ground economy. To appreciate the power of taxes to depress employment 
and distort production decisions, consider the choice between market pro-
vision and home production in the simple case with no capital inputs. The 
household opts for the least-  cost source of supply. In the absence of taxes, 
we can express the household’s decision rule as




where WP is the wage rate of the professional supplier in the market, HP is 
the production time required by the professional, WB is the opportunity cost 
of household time, and HB is the time input required in household produc-
tion. According to equation (1), the law of comparative advantage governs 
the choice of production sector. The household opts for self-  supply when it 
has comparative advantage at the production activity in question and opts 
for market provision when the professional has comparative advantage. This 
decision rule is socially eﬃcient in the sense of minimizing the value of scarce 
time resources used up in production.
Taxes break this link between privately optimal decisions and socially 
eﬃcient outcomes. To see this point, let t denote the tax rate on the 236        Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson
household’s labor income, let s denote the payroll tax rate on the profes-
sional’s compensation, and let m denote the tax rate on consumption expen-
ditures. The decision rule for the choice of production sector becomes











As seen in equation (2), higher tax rates raise the threshold compara-
tive advantage ratio at which the market solution dominates. The private 
choice of production sector is now governed by a tax-  distorted law of 
comparative advantage.8 Too few tasks are carried out in the market sector 
because of taxes, and too little time is spent working in the market. Con-
versely, too many tasks are carried out in the household (or underground) 
sector, and too much time is spent working outside the formal market 
sector.
As tax rates rise, marginal producers in the market sector are displaced 
by less-  eﬃcient producers in the household sector. This displacement eﬀect 
lowers average productivity computed over the market and household sec-
tors, but it raises oﬃcial productivity measures, because they do not encom-
pass the household sector.9 Hence, the displacement eﬀect also leads oﬃcial 
statistics to overstate true productivity in high-  tax societies relative to that 
of low-  tax societies. This eﬀect operates even when all workers have the 
same productivity and earnings ability in market-  based activities. Thus, the 
productivity eﬀect identiﬁ  ed here is distinct from the idea that the tax and 
transfer system has bigger disemployment eﬀects on the least productive 
workers.
To assess whether tax rates in the relevant range signiﬁ  cantly alter the 
composition of market-  based activity, Davis and Henrekson (2005a) con-
sider fourteen rich countries with comparable data on tax rates and on the 
industry distribution of market activity. They identify tax-  sensitive indus-
tries on a priori grounds, then investigate whether such industries have 
lower employment and output shares in high-  tax countries. Employment 
and output shares are markedly lower in a broad group of tax-  sensitive 
industries that includes retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and consumer 
repair services. An increase in the tax- distorted comparative advantage ratio 
by 25 basis points lowers the employment share in this industry group by 
8. Davis and Henrekson (2005a) derive analogous decision rules when production requires 
capital and labor.
9. If ﬁ  rms diﬀer in their ability to evade taxes, then taxes need not crowd out the least 
productive ﬁ  rms. In this case, taxes can lower average productivity and raise average pretax 
production costs within the formal market sector. See Palda (1998) for an analysis of this issue. 
Strand (2005) analyzes the eﬃciency consequences of taxation in a model with three produc-
tion sectors—the above-  ground market economy, the black market economy, and production 
for own use in the household. He also provides an extensive set of references to other work 
on the eﬃciency eﬀects of income and consumption taxes in models with taxed and untaxed 
production sectors.Economic Performance and Market Work Activity in Sweden    2 3 7
2.4 percentage points, or by 12 percent of industry employment evaluated 
at the mean. Similarly, a 25 basis point rise lowers the value added share by 
an estimated 1.9 points (13 percent). Davis and Henrekson also ﬁ  nd that 
the share of market activity accounted for by eating, drinking, and lodging 
establishments is twice as sensitive to taxes as the broader industry group. In 
contrast, the share of employment in manufacturing shows a positive, statis-
tically insigniﬁ  cant relationship to the tax- distorted comparative advantage 
ratio. These cross- country patterns support the view that taxes on labor and 
consumption distort the choice of production sector, and in the process, 
depress employment in the formal market economy.
These results also help to explain certain aspects of Sweden’s industry 
structure. In particular, compared to countries with lower tax burdens on 
consumption expenditures and labor income—for example, Canada, Ire-
land, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States—Sweden 
has small employment and output shares in retail trade, consumer repair ser-
vices, and eating, drinking, and lodging establishments. Production activity 
is relatively labor intensive in these industries and relatively easy to substitute 
between the market sector and home production (or the underground sec-
tor). Hence, high tax burdens push production activity in these industries 
out of the (legal) market sector. This interpretation ﬁ  nds additional sup-
port in table 7.2, which shows that Swedes devote considerably more time 
to domestic household work, especially meal preparation and dishwashing, 
than Americans.
Another type of evidence on tax-  induced displacements of employment 
and production is available from oﬃcial adjustments to Swedish GDP 
accounts. Statistics Sweden now makes upward adjustments to oﬃcial 
measures of GDP in an eﬀort to capture unrecorded black market activity. 
These adjustments go back to 1993, and they are largely based on an inquiry 
carried out in 1997 by the National Audit Oﬃce (1997). Table 7.3 reports 
the oﬃcial adjustments by industry in 1996. The largest adjustments are 
for auto repair, restaurants, taxi services, and hairdressing, and the small-
est are for industry and consulting. These patterns are consistent with the 
hypothesis that high tax rates and burdensome regulations shift the mix 
of (above-  ground) market production away from labor-  intensive activities 
(e.g., restaurants and hairdressing) and toward capital-  intensive and skill-
  intensive activities (e.g., industry and consulting). A new comprehensive 
inquiry conducted in 2005/  2006 by the Swedish National Tax Board (2006) 
found results consistent with the 1997 study. Total black market work is 
estimated at 4 to 5 percent of GDP.10 An estimated 13 percent of all per-
sons aged eighteen to seventy-  four engaged in black market work within 
the previous year, an increase of 2 percentage points compared to the 1997 
10. Indirect methods for estimating the size of the black market economy in Sweden tend to 
produce much larger numbers. See, for example, table 4.3 in Schneider and Enste (2002).238        Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson
study. Hours worked in the black market are estimated to have increased in 
roughly the same proportion.11
Our cross-  country investigation in Davis and Henrekson (2005a) also 
ﬁ  nds that higher tax rates on labor income and consumption expenditures 
lead to less work activity in the formal market sector as a whole and to a 
larger underground economy.12 Consider, for example, a 12.8 percentage 
point diﬀerence in the tax rate between two countries, which amounts to 
a unit standard deviation in the cross section of countries. Using data for 
the mid-  1990s, we estimate that a tax increase of this size leads to 122 fewer 
hours worked per adult per year in the formal market sector, a drop of 4.9 
percentage points in the employment-  population ratio, and a rise in the 
underground economy equal to 3.8 percent of GDP. Evaluating at means in 
the cross-  country sample, the implied elasticity of aggregate hours worked 
with respect to the combined tax rate on labor and consumption is – 0.55. As 
we explain in our earlier work, our estimates reﬂ  ect the direct eﬀect of taxes 
Table 7.3  Adjustments to oﬃcial GDP for black market activity by Statistics 
Sweden, 1996
  Industry  
Black market activity, 













  Other   4.5  
Source: SOU 2002:113 (Stockholm: Ministry of Finance).
11. More speciﬁ  cally, a special inquiry into the underreporting of revenue in restaurants 
indicates an increase in black market activity in recent years: “The Swedish National Tax Board 
estimates, based on an extensive audit of the restaurant industry in the county of Dalecarlia, 
that the unreported revenue in the restaurant industry in 1995 nationwide amounted to 37 per-
cent of total revenues of 20 billion kronor, or approximately 7 billion kronor. The degree of tax 
evasion has subsequently accelerated. More recent estimates suggest that unreported revenues 
amount to roughly double in 2002, i.e. 15 billion kronor” (Skatteverket, Skattestatistisk Årsbok 
2004, 238; authors’ translation). Fifteen billion kronor amounts to 102 percent of total value 
added in restaurants in 2002, according to the National Accounts.
12. Many other studies investigate the role of tax rates in cross-  country diﬀerences in work 
activity and the size of the underground economy. Several recent studies in this area are moti-
vated by the provocative work of Prescott (2004). See Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005), 
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on labor supply and labor demand plus the eﬀects of tax- funded welfare and 
social insurance programs on labor supply incentives.
Taxes on labor income and consumption expenditures also alter relative 
labor demands among workers in a potentially important manner. Tax-
 sensitive industries include eating and drinking establishments, laundry and 
cleaning services, child care, consumer repair services, domestic household 
help, and most personal services. As suggested by this list, tax-  sensitive sec-
tors tend to rely heavily on less-  skilled workers with lower schooling and 
wages. Hence, uniform tax rates on labor income and consumption expen-
ditures have disproportionately large negative eﬀects on the demand for 
less- skilled workers, depressing their relative wages and employment oppor-
tunities.
The interaction of wage-  setting institutions and high tax rates is also 
important in the Swedish case. Institutions that compress pretax wages re-
inforce tax-  induced distortions in the choice between market provision and 
home production. To see this point, consider ﬁ  rst the impact of institu-
tional forces that raise wages for less-  skilled, lower-  wage workers. Because 
activities with easy substitution between home and market production rely 
heavily on less-  skilled workers, wage ﬂ  oors for less-  skilled workers raise the 
cost of production by a larger percentage in these activities. In this respect, 
wage ﬂ  oors for less-  skilled workers reinforce the departures from com-
parative advantage induced by taxes on labor and consumption. Second, 
institutional forces that reduce wages for skilled workers aﬀect their choice 
between home production and market provision in the same way as higher 
labor income taxes. Again, the eﬀect is reinforced by tax-  induced depar-
tures from the law of comparative advantage in the choice of production 
sector.
7.2.2    Business  Tax  Policy
The preceding discussion indicates that Sweden’s compressed wage struc-
ture and high tax burdens on labor and consumption depress employment 
and output in industries that compete closely with the black market or 
unpaid household production. Some important aspects of Swedish busi-
ness tax policy have reinforced these eﬀects and have repressed further labor 
demand, as we now discuss.
Beginning in the early 1960s and continuing for three decades, eﬀective 
tax rates on business income in Sweden diﬀered tremendously by source of 
ﬁ  nance and ownership category. Debt was the most tax-  favored form of 
ﬁ  nancing, and new equity issues were the most penalized. Business owner-
ship positions held directly by individuals and families were taxed much 
more heavily than other ownership categories. To illustrate the magnitude of 
these diﬀerences, table 7.4 presents eﬀective marginal tax rates for diﬀerent 
combinations of owners and sources of ﬁ  nance. Three categories of owners 
and three sources of ﬁ  nance are identiﬁ  ed. The eﬀective marginal tax rates 240        Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson
are calculated assuming a 10 percent pretax real rate of return, an asset hold-
ing period of ten years, and an asset composition that matches the actual 
composition in manufacturing. A negative entry in table 7.4 means that the 
real rate of return is greater after tax than before tax.
Diﬀerences in eﬀective tax rates on Swedish business income were espe-
cially large around 1980. For example, a debt-  ﬁ  nanced business investment 
in 1980 oﬀering a pretax real return of 10 percent yielded an after- tax return 
Table 7.4  Eﬀective marginal tax rates on business income in Sweden by ownership 
category and source of ﬁ  nancing, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994, 
and 2005






Households 27.2 92.7 48.2
Tax- exempt  institutions –32.2 31.4 31.2
Insurance companies –21.7 41.6 34.0
1970
Households 51.3 122.1 57.1
Tax- exempt  institutions –64.8 15.9 32.7
Insurance companies –45.1 42.4 41.2
1980
Households 58.2 136.6 51.9
Tax- exempt  institutions –83.4 –11.6 11.2
Insurance companies –54.9 38.4 28.7
1985
Households 46.6 112.1 64.0
Tax- exempt  institutions –46.8 6.8 28.7
Insurance companies –26.5 32.2 36.3
1991
Households 31.7 61.8 54.2
Tax- exempt  institutions –9.4 4.0 18.7
Insurance companies 14.4 33.3 31.6
1994
Households 32.0/27.0a 28.3/18.3a 36.5/26.5a
Tax- exempt  institutions –14.9 21.8 21.8
Insurance companies 0.7 32.3 33.8
2005
Households 27.9/22.9a 58.1/48.1a 42.7/32.7a
Tax- exempt  institutions –1.2 23.2 23.1
  Insurance companies   18.2   44.6   42.6  
Source: Calculations provided by Jan Södersten; see also Södersten (1984, 1993).
Note: The calculations assume a real pretax return of 10 percent, an asset holding period of 
10 years, an asset composition identical to the actual composition in the manufacturing sector, 
and the following inﬂ  ation rates: 3 percent in 1960, 7 percent in 1970, 9.4 percent in 1980, 5 
percent in 1985 and 1991, and 2 percent in 1994 and 2005. The calculations conform to the 
general framework developed by King and Fullerton (1984).
aExcluding wealth tax; the wealth tax on unlisted shares was abolished in 1992. Hence, the 
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of 18.3 percent for a tax-  exempt institution such as a pension fund. The 
same business investment ﬁ  nanced by a new equity issue purchased directly 
by households yielded an after-  tax real return of –  3.7 percent. More gener-
ally, debt ﬁ  nancing was highly favored by the tax system throughout the 
period covered by table 7.4, and direct household ownership positions were 
heavily disfavored. King and Fullerton (1984) and Fukao and Hanazaki 
(1987) ﬁ  nd that Swedish tax policy was extreme in these respects compared 
to other countries.
These diﬀerences in eﬀective tax rates have potentially powerful eﬀects 
on the organization of business activity and the industry mix of productive 
activity. A few examples serve to make this point. First, to the extent that 
debt ﬁ  nancing is less costly and more readily available for larger and more 
ﬁ  rmly established ﬁ  rms, high statutory tax rates coupled with tax- deductible 
interest payments work to the disadvantage of smaller ﬁ  rms and potential 
entrants. Second, debt ﬁ  nancing is more easily available to ﬁ  rms with ready 
forms of collateral. Hence, ﬁ  rms and sectors that intensively utilize physical 
capital reap greater beneﬁ  ts from tax code provisions that favor debt ﬁ  nanc-
ing. This aspect of the tax system favors capital-  intensive industries and 
modes of production relative to labor-  intensive ones. Third, high tax rates 
on business income accruing directly to households represses many of the 
same activities as high tax rates on labor and consumption. Many economic 
activities that are highly substitutable between market provision and home 
production (e.g., cooking, cleaning, laundering, landscaping, home repairs) 
oﬀer greater- than- average scope for self- employment, employment in small 
ﬁ  rms, start-  ups, and family-  owned businesses.
7.2.3    Summary
Key features of the Swedish institutional setup have depressed market 
work activity. Heavy tax burdens on labor and consumption repress the 
market provision of services with close substitutes in the black market and 
home production. Wage-  setting institutions that compress pretax wage 
diﬀerentials reinforce this tax eﬀect. International comparisons indicate that 
market work activity is particularly sensitive to tax rates and wage compres-
sion in labor- intensive, service- oriented activities. Many activities that ﬁ  t this 
description also oﬀer greater- than- average scope for self- employment, small 
businesses, start-  ups, and family-  owned businesses. In addition, Sweden’s 
business tax policies have worked to the disadvantage of labor-  intensive 
industries and modes of production.
7.3      Institutional Developments in the 1990 to 2005 Period
We now turn to Swedish institutional developments since the early 1990s. 
We consider these developments in the light of both our earlier analyses and 
Swedish economic performance since the deep crisis of the early 1990s.242        Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson
7.3.1    Wage-  Setting  Arrangements
An important new wage-  bargaining agreement was introduced in Swe-
den in 1997—namely, the Agreement on Industrial Development and Wage 
Formation (Industriavtalet, IA).13 The IA is a further step toward more 
decentralized and individualized wage setting, a process that is often said 
to have started in 1983, when the metal workers’ union defected from the 
centralized regime (Hibbs and Locking 2000). Under the IA, many agree-
ments are reached that make no reference to centrally negotiated pay struc-
tures—everything is decided at the local level. Most agreements, however, 
still incorporate guarantees regarding minimum pay levels.
An important question is whether this new wage-  setting regime also 
aﬀected bargaining outcomes. After the demise of centralized bargaining 
in the mid- 1980s, wage dispersion began to increase among blue-  and white-
  collar workers (Edin and Topel 1997; Hibbs and Locking 2000; and Davis 
and Henrekson 2005b). As Lundborg (2005) documents, wage dispersion 
among blue-  collar workers leveled oﬀ in the mid-  1990s but began to rise 
even more sharply among white-  collar workers in the private sector. More-
over, average real wages began to increase much faster among white-  collar 
workers. From 1995 to 2005, average real wages rose by 43 percent for white-
 collar workers, as compared to 22 percent for blue- collar workers (based on 
a comprehensive wage measure that includes bonuses, paid overtime, and 
fringe beneﬁ  ts).14 In short, the period from 1995 to 2005 saw a considerable 
widening of the wage gap between white- collar and blue- collar workers and 
a sharp increase in wage dispersion among white-  collar workers (see also 
Fredriksson and Topel, chapter 3 in this volume).
7.3.2      Taxes on Labor and Consumption
The simple theory of task allocation sketched in section 7.2.1 identiﬁ  es the 
tax-  distorted comparative advantage ratio as a key determinant of market 
work activity and its composition. Motivated by this analysis, ﬁ  gure 7.4 
plots the evolution of the tax- distorted comparative advantage ratio, or tax 
factor, for three types of Swedish workers. The values in ﬁ  gure 7.4 capture 
mandatory Social Security contributions, consumption taxes, and marginal 
tax rates on labor income.
Swedish workers faced modest tax factors in the early 1950s of around 
two for executives and lower for others. The tax factors rose steadily after 
1952. By the late 1970s, they reached levels near four for industrial work-
ers, above ﬁ  ve for white-  collar workers, and above eight for executives. The 
tax factors declined somewhat in the 1980s, dropped sharply with the tax 
13. See Elvander (2002), Djerf et al. (2003), and Fredriksson and Topel (chapter 3 in this 
volume) for a more thorough description of the IA and its functioning.
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reform of 1990 and 1991, and crept upward in recent years as the result of 
higher tax rates at the local government level. As of 2006, Swedish tax fac-
tors stand at 2.54 for industrial workers, 3.44 for white-  collar workers, and 
3.85 for executives. The corresponding tax factors for the United States are 
in the interval of 1.4 to 2. While current Swedish tax factors are well below 
levels of the 1970s and 1980s, tax factors in the range of 2.5 to 3.9 still 
provide powerful incentives to shift production and employment out of the 
formal market sector. As a result, large parts of the service sector face harsh 
competition with unpaid work and the black market. These tax eﬀects are 
ampliﬁ  ed by institutions that compress the pretax wage distribution, as we 
explained in section 7.2.1.
Figure 7.4 does not account for some important tax- avoidance strategies. 
In particular, the income tax code in Sweden and many other countries 
provides signiﬁ  cant opportunities for households to reduce eﬀective tax 
burdens by shifting income to tax- favored sources, incurring tax- deductible 
expenses, and engaging in certain portfolio transactions. Before Sweden’s 
tax reform in 1990/  1991, high-  income earners “could exploit a number of 
asset transactions to escape taxation” (Agell, Persson, and Sacklén 2004, 
964). These transactions included “complex schemes of transforming cor-
porate income into low-  taxed capital gains” (964–  5), an unlimited ability 
to subtract net negative asset income from labor income when calculating 
Fig. 7.4    Tax-  Distorted comparative advantage ratios for three types of workers in 
Sweden, 1952 to 2006
Source: Du Rietz (1994) and new calculations supplied by Du Rietz.
Note: The tax factor for each category is evaluated at mean earnings each year. An executive 
is deﬁ  ned as an individual in the management group (below the CEO) in a private ﬁ  rm. The 
tax factor includes mandatory Social Security contributions paid by the employer or the em-
ployee, the marginal income tax, and the indirect taxes on private consumption. (All income 
is assumed to be spent for private consumption purposes.) Property taxes are excluded. The 
tax wedges for executives and average white-  collar workers coincide between 1991 and 1998.244        Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson
taxable income, tax-  deductible interest payments, the purchase of tax-
  preferred assets with borrowed funds, and intrafamily debt transactions. 
Households also, within limits, could invest in untaxed pension funds and 
tax-  favored savings accounts. Agell and Persson (2000) and Agell, Persson, 
and Sacklén (2004) present several pieces of evidence that high- income Swed-
ish households used these tax-  avoidance strategies to a signiﬁ  cant extent.
For our purposes, the theoretical and empirical literature on these 
asset-  based tax-  avoidance strategies yields some cautionary lessons. First, 
eﬀective tax factors are undoubtedly smaller than reported in ﬁ  gure 7.4. 
Second, the 1990/  1991 Swedish tax reform engineered a smaller reduction 
in eﬀective tax factors than suggested by ﬁ  gure 7.4 or by any other examina-
tion of statutory tax rates. In line with this conclusion, Malmer and Persson 
(1994) ﬁ  nd that the discrepancy between taxable income and labor income 
declined substantially in the wake of the 1990/  1991 tax reform. Similarly, 
Agell, Englund, and Södersten (1998) report that Swedish households initi-
ated a rapid pay down of their debts in the early 1990s. Third, because the 
tax reform imposed new restrictions on asset- based tax- avoidance strategies, 
it is possible that the reform actually raised eﬀective tax rates for many high-
  income earners. Hence, it is unclear whether and how much the tax reforms 
in 1990/  1991 stimulated employment or how much they softened the incen-
tives to shift certain production activities to the underground economy and 
unpaid household work.
7.3.3      Taxation of Business Income
The substantial tax preference for debt ﬁ  nancing described in section 
7.2.2 presupposed a policy of strictly regulated capital markets. However, 
the deregulation of domestic capital markets in the latter half of the 1980s 
greatly expanded credit availability, even as the tax system remained virtu-
ally unchanged and foreign exchange controls continued to limit investment 
abroad by Swedish households (Jonung 1994; Norrman and McLure 1997). 
Later, in 1991, the corporate tax rate was cut in half to its current value of 
28 percent.15 The conversion to a dual income tax system with a 30 percent 
ﬂ  at tax rate on capital income in 1991 and the abolition of wealth taxation 
on unlisted stock in 1992 favored individual equity investments relative to 
the earlier situation.
The tax burden on Swedish individual ownership remained heavier than 
the tax burden on institutional ownership and individual ownership in most 
other countries (Henrekson and Jakobsson 2005). Globalization has also 
made it easier for large Swedish incumbents to shift their ownership stakes 
to foreign tax jurisdictions in order to reduce corporate tax burdens and to 
escape personal taxation on ownership (Henrekson and Jakobsson 2005).
15. At ﬁ  rst, it was reduced to 30 percent. See Agell, Englund, and Södersten (1998) for a 
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Tax loopholes continue to channel individual wealth into institutional 
equity funds rather than owner-  operated businesses. For closely held com-
panies, there are restrictions on the payment of dividends—the so-  called 
3:12 rules. These rules were introduced in 1991 to prevent owners of proﬁ  t-
able small businesses from saving on taxes by paying themselves dividends 
taxed at 30 percent rather than wages taxed at the marginal tax rate for labor 
income. The scope for dividend payments thereby was restricted to a rela-
tively small percentage of the equity capital paid in by owners. To the extent 
that labor-  intensive service-  sector production tends to be more amenable 
to owner-  operated businesses and operations by nonlisted ﬁ  rms, this is a 
mechanism by which market work activity is discouraged.
7.3.4      Government Production of Income-  Elastic Services
On the surface, there appears to be substantial scope for private entrepre-
neurs in Sweden to compete with government production through public 
procurement programs and voucher systems in schooling, child care, and 
so forth. In practice, however, public providers are often insulated from 
competition with private business (Fölster and Peltzman, chapter 8 in this 
volume).
Due to the de facto public- sector monopolization of production in many 
income-  elastic services, vast areas of the economy remain unexploited as 
sources of commercial growth. In particular, in the health sector, it is easy 
to imagine how a diﬀerent organizational mode could provide a basis for 
the emergence of new high-  growth ﬁ  rms. Instead, large-  scale production in 
the manufacturing sector has been seen as a model for central parts of the 
production of highly income-  elastic services such as health care, child care, 
elderly care, and education. This has had a profound eﬀect on private- sector 
growth—from 1960 until the late 1990s, all net employment growth in Swe-
den took place in the local government sector (Rosen 1997).
These publicly produced services in many cases are highly suitable for 
production in private and often also small ﬁ  rms. The political decision to 
produce these services primarily through a public-  sector monopoly has 
largely barred this area from both startup activity and the emergence of 
high- growth ﬁ  rms. To provide some evidence on this point, table 7.5 summa-
rizes the share of private production for the major services that are fully or 
primarily tax ﬁ  nanced. The private production share is very low in activities 
such as child care, care of the elderly, and after-  school care, despite the fact 
that these activities are highly amenable to private, small-  ﬁ  rm production.
7.4      Recent Policy Developments and Changes in Market Work Activity
The center-  right government that took oﬃce after the September 2006 
elections implemented several policy reforms aimed at increasing market 
work activity. In this connection, we brieﬂ  y discuss the introduction of an 246        Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson
earned income tax credit (EITC), cuts in Social Security tax rates, tax breaks 
for household services, and changes in job security mandates and unemploy-
ment insurance.
Sweden introduced an EITC in 2007 and modiﬁ  ed the program in two later 
steps. Here, we consider the rules in eﬀect from January 2009. The average 
and marginal tax rate is zero up to an annual labor income of 38,500 Swedish 
kronor (SEK).16 From annual income of 38,500 SEK to 300,000 SEK, the 
marginal tax rate is lowered by roughly 5 percentage points (from roughly 
31 percent to 26 percent). For labor income exceeding 364,000 SEK, there 
is no eﬀect on the marginal tax rate, and the maximum rate is unchanged at 
roughly 56 percent. For older people, the taxation of labor income has been 
lowered even more by strengthening the eﬀect of the EITC system for this 
group. The marginal tax rate is now 11.5 percent for annual labor income 
between 38,500 SEK and 100,000 SEK in this group.
Economic theory implies that the EITC lowers workers’ gross wage 
demands, because they care about after-  tax wages. The result is likely to 
be greater work activity by the aﬀected groups. However, unions are press-
ing hard to undo this eﬀect by pushing for increased minimum wages in 
the relevant industries. To the extent that they succeed in these eﬀorts, 
Table 7.5  Sweden’s private-  sector production share for major services that are 
primarily publicly funded, 1996, 2000, and 2005 (%)
   Service   1996  2000  2005  
Institutional child care (preschool) 12.5 11.8 16.7
Child care in the home (of the professional) 2.2 8.6 12.0
After- school  care 4.5 — 9.2
Compulsory schooling 2.4 3.9 7.4
High school 1.9 4.4 13.4
Care of the elderly at nursing homes 8.3 10.0
13.2
Care of the elderly in special apartments 5.1 11.0
Care of the elderly in their own home 2.6 7 9.7
Hospital care 4.3 — 7.3a
Medical consultations 28 — 28.7
Share of doctors privately employed 10 7.3 7.0a
Psychiatric wards 24 — 5.9
  Children’s dental care   5   —   9.8  
Source: Werenfels Röttorp (1998) for 1996; Jordahl (2002) for 2000; Socialstyrelsen (2006) for 
care of the elderly in 2005; The Swedish National Agency for Education (www.skolverket.se/) 
for all schooling measures in 2005; and Jordahl (2006) for health and dental care in 2005.
Note: For 2005, the categories “care of the elderly at nursing homes” and “care of the elderly 
in special apartments” cannot be distinguished, so they comprise one category.




16. Using a purchasing power parity adjusted exchange rate of 9.2 SEK per U.S. dollar in 
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they will undo the positive eﬀects of the EITC program on market work 
activity.
Social Security (SS) rates have been reduced for several demographic 
groups.17 There was an across-  the-  board reduction of 1 percentage point 
(down to 31.4 percent), plus a further reduction of 2 percentage points for 
self- employed persons who opt for a thirty- day waiting period in the sickness 
insurance system. Prior to 2007, the SS rate for pensioners was 24 percent, 
but it has now been reduced to 0 percent for people above age seventy and 
to 10.2 percent for those aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  nine and for those aged 
sixty-  one to sixty-  four who withdraw their public pension (allowed from 
age sixty-  one). In addition, the SS rate has been cut to 15.5 percent (half 
of the regular rate) for employees aged sixteen to twenty-  ﬁ  ve, to 0 percent 
for people coming oﬀ disability pensions or a paid sick leave of more than 
one year’s duration,18 and to 0 percent for refugees who get a job while they 
study Swedish.
In 2007, the government also introduced a large tax break on household-
  related services. The maximum tax reduction is 50,000 SEK per person, 
amounting to 50 percent of the labor cost, including value added tax. The 
tasks must be performed at or in the immediate vicinity of the buyer’s own 
home. Eligible tasks include cleaning, washing, cooking, child care, and 
gardening. For a household of two adults, services eligible for a subsidy of 
up to 200,000 SEK per year can be purchased. This is a huge reduction in the 
eﬀective tax rate on many market-  mediated substitutes for own-  household 
production. Given prevailing market wages for this type of work, the tax 
break can be applied to roughly 800 to 1,000 hours per year of purchased 
services.
As an example, suppose the buyer faces the highest marginal tax rate of 
56.5 percent, and the seller of household services is an older person who 
faces a Social Security tax rate of 10.2 percent under the new regime. In this 
example, the tax factor falls from 3.9 under the 2005 tax code to (1  0.102)
(1  0.25)/  (1 –   0.565)  1/  2  1.58 under the 2007 regime. For persons who 
qualify for the zero percent tax rate under the new regime, the eﬀective tax 
factor falls to 1.44. Based on the analysis and evidence previously reviewed 
in section 7.2.1, we anticipate that this change in the tax law will eventually 
stimulate a large increase in the market provision of household services. At 
this writing, however, there is little evidence of such an increase. Based on 
the experience of Finland, it takes some time for a system like this to gain 
momentum.19 Moreover, families who employ help in the black market may 
17. These reductions in SS tax rates described in this paragraph are partly oﬀset by the fact 
that an earlier reduction of up to 5 percentage points on wages up to 740,000 SEK per year 
was rescinded in 2007 (which had been in eﬀect since the late 1990s).
18. The 0 percent SS rate applies for a period of time that matches the duration of the pre-
vious spell of disability or paid sick leave.
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continue to do so. In some cases, families may be unwilling to ﬁ  re helpers 
who lack a valid work permit. In other cases, they may make payments oﬀ 
the books to persons who receive social welfare beneﬁ  ts and who, if the 
income were declared, would face an eﬀective tax rate of 100 percent.
From July 1, 2007, Swedish job security mandates were relaxed, in that 
ﬁ  rms are now allowed to employ anyone for up to twenty- four months with-
out granting tenure rights, as long as the term of employment is preﬁ  xed. A 
host of measures have also made it more diﬃcult to be eligible for unemploy-
ment beneﬁ  ts. Examples include a requirement to accept jobs outside one’s 
immediate expertise and an obligation to relocate for a new job if there are 
suitable openings. The retention rate in the unemployment insurance has 
been reduced from 80 percent to 70 percent of the former wage (up to a cap). 
Finally, the maximum number of days that one can receive unemployment 
beneﬁ  ts has been lowered. Altogether, these measures are likely to increase 
search intensity among jobless persons.
It is premature to quantify the impact of recent tax and labor market 
reforms on Swedish work activity. However, our analysis suggests that the 
reforms described here will stimulate market work activity, perhaps by a 
signiﬁ  cant amount. Recent changes in employment and market work hours 
are consistent with this prediction. Figure 7.5 shows a continuing increase in 
employment and hours worked per person aged sixteen to sixty- four through 
the second quarter of 2008 (the latest available data). Since the second quar-
ter of 2006, the number of hours worked per person aged sixteen to sixty-
 four rose 6.7 percent in the private sector, and employment rose 6.4 percent. 
These are sizeable increases, consistent with what we would expect from the 
recent policy reforms. However, to what extent these employment eﬀects 
can be attributed to the reforms and to what extent they are due to business 
cycle eﬀects is too early to tell.
7.5    Concluding  Remarks
After the deep economic contraction in the early 1990s, Sweden enjoyed 
strong output growth relative to the 1970s and 1980s and relative to contem-
poraneous experience in much of the OECD and EU. However, relatively 
rapid output growth failed to produce much recovery in employment or 
market work hours. Thirteen years after the trough in 1993, hours worked 
per person of working age remained roughly 10 percent below their peak 
in 1990. International comparisons indicate that Swedes spend consider-
ably less time in market work activity than Americans and the average for 
European countries.
One possible reaction to these outcomes is a shrug of complacency. If 
Swedes choose to enjoy the fruits of economic progress in the form of more 
leisurely lifestyles and a more robust social safety net, that is a perfectly rea-
sonable, even sensible, path to follow. We think this view is too sanguine on Economic Performance and Market Work Activity in Sweden    2 4 9
several counts. First, the dramatic drop in Swedish work activity in the early 
1990s coincided with a sharp contraction in output and real incomes. More-
over, low work time is not taken by individuals with high income; rather, it 
mainly reﬂ  ects persons of relatively modest means who work little or not 
at all (Björklund and Freeman, chapter 1 in this volume). These time-  series 
and cross-  sectional patterns do not ﬁ  t a story of rising real incomes used to 
purchase additional leisure.
Second, the inference that low market work hours means plentiful lei-
sure is unwarranted. Data from time-  use surveys indicate that working-  age 
Swedes devote nearly as much time to work as Americans, once domestic 
household work is factored into the comparison. Working- age Swedes actu-
ally enjoy less leisure than their American counterparts, according to our 
comparison of recent time- use surveys. The time- use evidence squares neatly 
with evidence that Sweden and other high- tax countries have comparatively 
small output and employment shares in sectors that produce time-  saving 
goods and services.
Third, recent international studies ﬁ  nd evidence of a sizable elasticity of 
aggregate work hours with respect to the combined tax rate on labor income 
and consumption expenditures.20 Our own work based on cross-  country 
variation in a sample of rich countries in 1995 yields an estimated hours 
elasticity of – 0.55. Dew- Becker and Gordon (2006) estimate an elasticity of 
–  0.4 based on within-  country time-  series variation from 1960 to 2004. We 
Fig. 7.5    Hours worked per person aged sixteen to sixty-  four and employment in 
the total economy and in the private sector, Sweden 2005:I–  2008:II.
Source: Statistics Sweden.
Note: All data are seasonally adjusted, and hours worked are annualized.
20. See Davis and Henrekson (2005a), Dew-  Becker and Gordon (2006), and Rogerson 
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interpret these estimated elasticity values as reﬂ  ecting the combined eﬀects 
of high tax rates on labor supply and demand, plus the eﬀects of tax- funded 
welfare and social insurance programs on labor supply incentives. Tax and 
spending eﬀects of this magnitude are likely to generate sizable welfare losses 
in a country with a public sector as large as Sweden’s (Aronsson and Walker, 
chapter 4 in this volume).
Several recent policy changes have created a favorable environment for 
the expansion of market work activity in Sweden. The introduction of an 
earned income tax credit, sharp reductions in Social Security tax rates for 
certain demographic groups, big drops in eﬀective tax burdens on the market 
provision of household services such as cooking and cleaning, the relaxation 
of job security mandates, and the tightening of eligibility requirements for 
unemployment beneﬁ  ts are noteworthy developments in this regard. While 
it is too early to conﬁ  dently assess the impact of these reforms, our analysis 
and evidence suggest that they will raise market work activity over time, per-
haps substantially. Increases in private-  sector employment and work hours 
from 2006 to 2008 are consistent with this view.
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